Tag: terrorism

  • Automotive Irredentism

    pictured: The Yukon XL—"the national car of Texas"

    I recently finished reading a book on TFK terrorism (essentially) called The Bullet’s Song. As pretentious as this lead-in sentence sounds, I really did read the book and, in the process, learned some fascinating words.

    Like irredentism. It’s from the Italian for "unclaimed territory." I believe it came into fashion as the Italian poet and social libertine Gabrielle D’Annunzio formed the break-away and short-lived Republic Of Fiume after World War I. Great story. Which leads me to my headline.

    I just returned from a trip to West Texas (Houston—close enough). It’s clear to me that people in this part of Texas will not be happy until every last stretch of asphalt has been claimed and/or reclaimed for the largest possible SUV you can put on the road. In fact, it is terrifying to to rent anything less than a Town Car when you travel in this part of the country.

    Which makes me fear for my friends in Austin.

  • The Grounded Man

    Editor’s Note: In May 2005, The Rake ran a story by former KSTP-TV reporter Dean
    Staley about Clancy Prevost, the man whose suspicions about his flight
    student Zacharias Moussaui led to the apprehension of the “twentieth
    hijacker” behind the 9/11 attacks. Before our story hit the street in
    print, but after it was posted on our website, the
    StarTribune, in an
    attempt to discredit us and Prevost, (and to take credit themselves for
    the story of who caught Moussaui) ran a front page story the day before
    our story hit the streets crediting the tip that led to Moussaui to Tim
    Nelson and Hugh Sims, colleagues of Prevost at the Pan Am Flight
    Academy.

    As noted in a Strib story today (January 25, 2008), the State and Justice
    Departments gave a $5 million reward for the Moussaui tip to Clancy
    Prevost, not to Nelson and Sims. It seems the State and Justice
    Departments thought
    The Rake story had it right, and the Strib had it
    wrong. Our story is below.

    —Tom Bartel

    He wraps his long fingers around his coffee cup, measures me with steady pale blue eyes, the eyes of an airline pilot. He smiles at the absurdity of his story. We are just a few miles down the road from the Eagan flight school where, one month before the September 11th attacks, he tried to teach Zacarias Moussaoui how to fly a Boeing 747.

    His name is Clancy Prevost. He is sixty-eight years old, a retired pilot for Northwest Airlines, a lapsed Catholic, and a recovering alcoholic. He shakes his head as he recalls his story publicly for the first time.

    The morning of August 13, 2001, was warm and humid, the Minnesota summer nearing its peak. Clancy Prevost left his room at the Spring Hill Suites, his local lodging when he commutes from the East Coast. He jumped on the hotel shuttle and headed for the nearby offices of the Pan-Am International Flight Academy. He wore a blue polo shirt, khakis, and red Converse sneakers.

    At 10:30 that morning, Prevost walked into the air-conditioned lobby of the Northwest Aerospace Training Corporation, Northwest Airlines’ affiliated training facility. Here his employer, Pan Am Flight Academy, leases time on a range of multimillion-dollar simulators, including the 747-400 model, which realistically mimics the flight deck of a Boeing 747. There, thirty days before September 11th, he shook hands with the man the government would later call “the twentieth hijacker.”

    ”He was pleasant, but I expected him to be better dressed. He just was wearing Dockers and they didn’t fit real well, he was a little overweight, and he had this baseball hat, and growth of beard,” Prevost recalls. There was nothing remarkable about Moussaoui. In fact, Prevost’s first impressions of Moussaoui barely registered at all.

    Prevost expects young pilots to arrive with energy, even nervousness, but from Moussaui, he got nothing. “I guess I wanted him to be a little more alive and comin’ at ya. But there wasn’t much comin’ at ya. It was just, ‘Hello.’”

    Prevost wrote off Moussaoui’s timidity to first-day jitters. “It’s understandable since it’s all new. It’s daunting even to the experienced pilots that show up, let alone this guy who’s wandering in to supposedly kill everybody.

    Moussaoui’s demeanor may have helped him go unnoticed during the five and a half months leading up to his arrest. He arrived in Chicago from London on February 23 and declared at least thirty-five thousand dollars in cash on his customs form. He traveled to Oklahoma City, and later to Minnesota. Along the way, Moussaoui bought knives and flight-training videos and inquired about starting a crop-dusting company. Not once did he draw the attention of authorities. Not even when he walked into the Pan Am flight school, counted out sixty-eight one-hundred dollar bills, and signed up to learn how to fly a 747. His luck ended the day he met his flight instructor, Clancy Prevost.

    At first glance, Moussaoui was the kind of client Prevost had seen before: a wealthy civilian with no ties to the airline industry who wanted to learn how to fly a commercial jetliner. One might be surprised to learn how many “vanity clients” come to flight school, men of means with lots of free time, whose ultimate hope is apparently to impress women with a 747-type rating—bragging rights worth thousands of dollars. (Normally, most of Pan Am’s students are working, commercial pilots who are training to upgrade their ratings from smaller passenger jets. Maybe two or three vanity students turn up each year.) But that first day, Moussaoui would prove unlike any other student Prevost had known.

    At 10:45, Prevost and Moussaoui took a shuttle van a mile and a half to the Pan-Am classroom building to start ground school. Michael Guess, a twenty-one-year-old support worker, met them at the reception desk. Guess set them up in a room with a projector and a PowerPoint presentation on the systems of the 747-400. (Guess, an aspiring pilot himself, would die a year later copiloting the flight that crashed and killed Senator Paul Wellstone in the woods of Northern Minnesota.)

    The room was not much bigger than a large office. Moussaoui sat down. Prevost drew the blinds. Standing, he projected the PowerPoint presentation onto the white wall. Prevost paged his way through the schematics of the 747-400. Using color-coded charts and graphics, he described the hydraulic systems that power the flight control surfaces: the rudder, flaps, and horizontal elevator at the rear of the aircraft.

    Moussaoui repeated some of the technical phrases and asked a few questions. Prevost, who flew 747s for Northwest Airlines, smiles and says, “I knew he wasn’t pilot material, because he’d actually read his manuals and he didn’t talk about pussy.” But over the course of the lesson, an odd pattern emerged. Moussaoui used the correct jargon, but his questions often didn’t make sense or were out of context.

    Prevost tried to explain to Moussaoui the complex backup systems that in an emergency mean the difference between life and death. “There are two parts each. You have your engine-driven pumps and the backups to the engine-driven pumps, which are the man (manual) pumps. Two of them are electric. Two of them are air-driven. One and four are air-driven. Two and three are electric. The EDPs (engine driven pumps) are the main pumps and floor systems.”

    Moussaoui was plainly bewildered. “So you say stuff like that and he’s sitting there like…” Prevost drops his jaw, gives a blank look. “It’s useless. He doesn’t have any knowledge on anything.” Moussaoui’s reaction exposed him as a man profoundly out of his depth trying to learn to fly a 747. Frustrated, looking for a break, Prevost suggested they get lunch. By 11:30, they were back at the NATCO building.

    They sat down to lunch in the cafeteria. Prevost asked Moussaoui what he did for a living. Moussaoui said he worked in the import/export business, that his family was covering for him while he was gone. Though Moussaoui is a French national of Moroccan descent, he never said specifically where he was from. Moussaoui told Prevost he had to get his training done as soon as possible, because there was only so much time his family would cover for him.

    Prevost remembers trying to stall, because the training seemed pointless with such an unpromising student. “We’re sitting up there in the cafeteria and I’m thinking, I’m going to stay here for two or three hours because I don’t want to go back to the classroom building and try to teach him something, because you can’t. There’s no awareness of anything.” Moussaoui seemed equally discouraged. He had good reason.

  • Do Terror Alerts Work?

    As I read the litany of terror threat warnings that the government has issued in the past three years, the thing that jumps out at me is how vague they are. The careful wording implies everything without actually saying anything. We hear “terrorists might try to bomb buses and rail lines in major U.S. cities this summer,” and there’s “increasing concern about the possibility of a major terrorist attack.” “At least one of these attacks could be executed by the end of the summer 2003.” Warnings are based on “uncorroborated intelligence,” and issued even though “there is no credible, specific information about targets or method of attack.” And, of course, “weapons of mass destruction, including those containing chemical, biological, or radiological agents or materials, cannot be discounted.”

    Terrorists might carry out their attacks using cropdusters, helicopters, scuba divers, even prescription drugs from Canada. They might be carrying almanacs. They might strike during the Christmas season, disrupt the “democratic process,” or target financial buildings in New York and Washington.

    It’s been more than two years since the government instituted a color-coded terror alert system, and the Department of Homeland Security has issued about a dozen terror alerts in that time. How effective have they been in preventing terrorism? Have they made us any safer, or are they causing harm? Are they, as critics claim, just a political ploy?

    When Attorney General John Ashcroft came to Minnesota recently, he said the fact that there had been no terrorist attacks in America in the three years since September 11th was proof that the Bush administration’s anti-terrorist policies were working. I thought: There were no terrorist attacks in America in the three years before September 11th, and we didn’t have any terror alerts. What does that prove?

    In theory, the warnings are supposed to cultivate an atmosphere of preparedness. If Americans are vigilant against the terrorist threat, then maybe the terrorists will be caught and their plots foiled. And repeated warnings brace Americans for the aftermath of another attack.

    The problem is that the warnings don’t do any of this. Because they are so vague and so frequent, and because they don’t recommend any useful actions that people can take, terror threat warnings don’t prevent terrorist attacks. They might force a terrorist to delay his plan temporarily, or change his target. But in general, professional security experts like me are not particularly impressed by systems that merely force the bad guys to make minor modifications in their tactics.

    And the alerts don’t result in a more vigilant America. It’s one thing to issue a hurricane warning, and advise people to board up their windows and remain in the basement. Hurricanes are short-term events, and it’s obvious when the danger is imminent and when it’s over. People can do useful things in response to a hurricane warning; then there is a discrete period when their lives are markedly different, and they feel there was utility in the higher alert mode, even if nothing came of it.

    It’s quite another thing to tell people to be on alert, but not to alter their plans—as Americans were instructed last Christmas. A terrorist alert that instills a vague feeling of dread or panic, without giving people anything to do in response, is ineffective. Indeed, it inspires terror itself. Compare people’s reactions to hurricane threats with their reactions to earthquake threats. According to scientists, California is expecting a huge earthquake sometime in the next two hundred years. Even though the magnitude of the disaster will be enormous, people just can’t stay alert for two centuries. The news seems to have generated the same levels of short-term fear and long-term apathy in Californians that the terrorist warnings do. It’s human nature; people simply can’t be vigilant indefinitely.

    It’s true too that people want to make their own decisions. Regardless of what the government suggests, people are going to independently assess the situation. They’re going to decide for themselves whether or not changing their behavior seems like a good idea. If there’s no rational information to base their independent assessment on, they’re going to come to conclusions based on fear, prejudice, or ignorance.

    We’re already seeing this in the U.S. We see it when Muslim men are assaulted on the street. We see it when a woman on an airplane panics because a Syrian pop group is flying with her. We see it again and again, as people react to rumors about terrorist threats from Al Qaeda and its allies endlessly repeated by the news media.

    This all implies that if the government is going to issue a threat warning at all, it should provide as many details as possible. But this is a catch-22: Unfortunately, there’s an absolute limit to how much information the government can reveal. The classified nature of the intelligence that goes into these threat alerts precludes the government from giving the public all the information it would need to be meaningfully prepared. And maddeningly, the current administration occasionally compromises the intelligence assets it does have, in the interest of politics. It recently released the name of a Pakistani agent working undercover in Al Qaeda, blowing ongoing counterterrorist operations both in Pakistan and the U.K.

    Still, ironically, most of the time the administration projects a “just trust me” attitude. And there are those in the U.S. who trust it, and there are those who do not. Unfortunately, there are good reasons not to trust it. There are two reasons government likes terror alerts. Both are self-serving, and neither has anything to do with security.

    The first is such a common impulse of bureaucratic self-protection that it has achieved a popular acronym in government circles: CYA. If the worst happens and another attack occurs, the American public isn’t going to be as sympathetic to the current administration as it was last time. After the September 11th attacks, the public reaction was primarily shock and disbelief. In response, the government vowed to fight the terrorists. They passed the draconian USA PATRIOT Act, invaded two countries, and spent hundreds of billions of dollars. Next time, the public reaction will quickly turn into anger, and those in charge will need to explain why they failed. The public is going to demand to know what the government knew and why it didn’t warn people, and they’re not going to look kindly on someone who says: “We didn’t think the threat was serious enough to warn people.” Issuing threat warnings is a way to cover themselves. “What did you expect?” they’ll say. “We told you it was Code Orange.”

    The second purpose is even more self-serving: Terror threat warnings are a publicity tool. They’re a method of keeping terrorism in people’s minds. Terrorist attacks on American soil are rare, and unless the topic stays in the news, people will move on to other concerns. There is, of course, a hierarchy to these things. Threats against U.S. soil are most important, threats against Americans abroad are next, and terrorist threats—even actual terrorist attacks—against foreigners in foreign countries are largely ignored.

    Since the September 11th attacks, Republicans have made “tough on terror” the centerpiece of their reelection strategies. Study after study has shown that Americans who are worried about terrorism are more likely to vote Republican. In 2002, Karl Rove specifically told Republican legislators to run on that platform, and strength in the face of the terrorist threat is the basis of Bush’s reelection campaign. For that strategy to work, people need to be reminded constantly about the terrorist threat and how the current government is keeping them safe.

    It has to be the right terrorist threat, though. Last month someone exploded a pipe bomb in a stem-cell research center near Boston, but the administration didn’t denounce this as a terrorist attack. In April 2003, the FBI disrupted a major terrorist plot in the U.S., arresting William Krar and seizing automatic weapons, pipe bombs, bombs disguised as briefcases, and at least one cyanide bomb—an actual chemical weapon. But because Krar was a member of a white supremacist group and not Muslim, Ashcroft didn’t hold a press conference, Tom Ridge didn’t announce how secure the homeland was, and Bush never mentioned it.

    Threat warnings can be a potent tool in the fight against terrorism—when there is a specific threat at a specific moment. There are times when people need to act, and act quickly, in order to increase security. But this is a tool that can easily be abused, and when it’s abused it loses
    its effectiveness.

    It’s instructive to look at the European countries that have been dealing with terrorism for decades, like the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Italy, and Spain. None of these has a color-coded terror-alert system. None calls a press conference on the strength of “chatter.” Even Israel, which has seen more terrorism than any other nation in the world, issues terror alerts only when there is a specific imminent attack and they need people to be vigilant. And these alerts include specific times and places, with details people can use immediately. They’re not dissimilar from hurricane warnings.

    A terror alert that instills a vague feeling of dread or panic echoes the very tactics of the terrorists. There are essentially two ways to terrorize people. The first is to do something spectacularly horrible, like flying airplanes into skyscrapers and killing thousands of people. The second is to keep people living in fear with the threat of doing something horrible. Decades ago, that was one of the IRA’s major aims. Inadvertently, the DHS is achieving the same thing.

    There’s another downside to incessant threat warnings, one that happens when everyone realizes that they have been abused for political purposes. Call it the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” problem. After too many false alarms, the public will become inured to them. Already this has happened. Many Americans ignore terrorist threat warnings; many even ridicule them. The Bush administration lost considerable respect when it was revealed that August’s New York/Washington warning was based on three-year-old information. And the more recent warning that terrorists might target cheap prescription drugs from Canada was assumed universally to be politics-as-usual.

    Repeated warnings do more harm than good, by needlessly creating fear and confusion among those who still trust the government, and anesthetizing everyone else to any future alerts that might be important. And every false alarm makes the next terror alert less effective.

    Fighting global terrorism is difficult, and it’s not something that should be played for political gain. Countries that have been dealing with terrorism for decades have realized that much of the real work happens outside of public view, and that often the most important victories are the most secret. The elected officials of these countries take the time to explain this to their citizens, who in return have a realistic view of what the government can and can’t do to keep them safe.

    By making terrorism the centerpiece of his reelection campaign, President Bush and the Republicans play a very dangerous game. They’re making many people needlessly fearful. They’re attracting the ridicule of others, both domestically and abroad. And they’re distracting themselves from the serious business of actually keeping Americans safe.

    Bruce Schneier is a security technologist and writer who lives in Minneapolis. His most recent book is BEYOND FEAR: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

  • Are You on a Terrorist Watch List?

    Santa’s big season is behind us now, but it’s Christmas all year round at the FBI, where the jolly elf’s omniscient surveillance powers probably inspired a young J. Edgar Hoover. The FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list debuted on March 14, 1950, complete with cash rewards stuffed into the stockings of informants. The Ten Most Wanted list has played a role in nabbing more than 400 nasty criminals in its 52 years.

    “Of course list-making is nothing new to police work,” said Inspector Nick O’Hara in a recent interview with The Rake. O’Hara, who served as special agent in charge of the FBI’s Minnesota field office from 1991 to 1994, remembers the Ten Most Wanted fondly. The list had fallen on hard times in the late 70s, with little attention paid to the cases other than dusting off the ubiquitous post-office mug shots. For a number of years, the list generated just one or two hits per annum. “The Most Wanted became a list of static individuals,” said O’Hara. “They’d been on there so long that the rationale for banging away at the public had been lost.”

    As chief of the violent crimes section in the mid-80s, O’Hara said he wanted to take better advantage of the list, and assigned more agents to try some routine police work on the cases. By way of example, he told the story of Charles Lee Herron, who had been on the list for more than 20 years after killing two police officers in Tennessee. A mere six months of legwork netted not only Herron, but his three accomplices. Suddenly, there was an opening for a fresh face on the list.

    Like retail inventory, O’Hara said turnover is the key to maintaining public interest. Over the next three years, they found 23 suspects on the Ten Most Wanted, making it popular again as a cultural institution.

    Long before 9/11, the Ten Most Wanted had spun off a number of similar lists. A sister list is produced at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The Ten Most Wanted also mated with the FOX television network, hatching John Walsh’s America’s Most Wanted television show, a strange joint effort of the entertainment industry and a federal law enforcement agency. Keeping in step with the times, the FBI has now created its own most-wanted list focusing on terrorists. Not to be outdone, the CIA reportedly has a list of Al Qaeda members who may be shot on sight, if they show up in public. “Lists are very important,” said O’Hara, clearly proud of these many iterations of a good idea.

    “We have found and clearly recognized that lists are useful tools when conducting investigations and gathering intelligence,” agreed Special Agent Paul McCabe in a recent conversation with The Rake. McCabe, a talkative straight-shooter from the Minneapolis field office of the FBI, confirmed the existence of a new Terrorism Watch List. Not to be confused with the Most Wanted Terrorists list which has been made public, the Watch List was originally launched as Project Lookout shortly after 9/11.

    Prior to 9/11, compiling the names of suspected terrorists was mostly the domain of TIPOFF. Started in 1987, TIPOFF is now a database of about 85,000 names compiled by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The State Department won’t divulge names on the list. It won’t say what specific use it makes of the list, or tell what the criteria are for getting on the list.

    Typical. In fact, secret lists are all the rage now with federal agencies. Where the Ten Most Wanted thrived by being in the public eye, the new generation of lists seems to succeed on the strength of secrecy—though of course there’s no way to be sure they’re being used for anything at all, or if they’re working. To learn more about these secret lists, The Rake contacted half a dozen federal agencies. What the federal government most wants you to know is this: You don’t need to know.